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ITALIAN ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS UNDER FASCISM*

Paul B. Ravat

O

BSERVERS not wholly familiar with the administration of the
present government of Italy are generally surprised by the fact
that the Council of State, the supreme administrative court, is still an
operating body after more than eighteen years of blackshirt revolution
and domination.1 It seems strange that a dictator should have preserved this agency, which was established in order to bring justice into
public administration,2 and which rapidly became the principal guardian
of individual rights against administrative arbitrariness. One asks how
the Council of State can, in a totalitarian state, continue to exercise its
functions of administrative court and of main administrative advisory
body to the government with any success as an ameliorative force.
In contrast to the old Chamber of Deputies, which has been the
subject of severe criticism in official circles, even after having become

*

J.U.D., Padua University; formerly lecturer on public law, Padua University;
author of various publications here and abroad.-Ed.
The writer is indebted to Professors Joseph P. Chamberlain, of Columbia University, and Ralph Fuchs, of Washington University, for suggestions made after reading
the first draft of this article.
1 Although there are several other Italian administrative courts, the present discussion will be restricted to the Council of State, which is the administrative court of
broader jurisdiction and thus the most important and representative.
2
Giustizia nel'fAmministrazione (justice in the administration) was the title
and subject of a famous speech made by Spaventa (1880), which led the movement
responsible for the evolution of the Council of State as a full administrative court. Unfortunately no substantial material on Italian administrative justice is available in English. Fundamental works are: ORLANDO, TEORIA DELLE GUARENTIGIE DELLA LIBERT.A
(1888); ORLANDO, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA, 2d ed. (1923), being 3 PRIMO
TRATIAT0 COMPLETO DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO; BRUNIALTI, I DIRITTI DEi CITIADINI
E LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA IN ITALIA ( I 890) ; Romano, "Le giurisdizioni speciali
amministrativa," 3 ORLANDO, TRATIATo, supra; VITIA, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA
(1903); I VITIA, DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO (1933); 8ALANDRA, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA NE! GOVERN! LIBERI (1904); CAMMEO, CoMMENTARIO ALLE LEGGY SULLA
GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA (without date); RANELLETTI, LE GUARENTIGIE DELLA
GIUSTIZIA NELLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE, 5th ed. (1936); I PRESUTTI, IsTITUZIONI DI DIRITIO AMMINISTRATIVO ITALIANO (1933); 2 D'ALESSIO, IsTITUZIONI DI
DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIV0 ITALIANO (1934); BoRSI, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA, 5th
ed. (1940); 2 ZANoBINI, CoRso DI DIRITIO AMMINISTRATivo (1939). In particular on
the Council of State, see Armanni, "Il Consiglio di Stato le sue funzioni consultive,"
3 ORLANDO, TRATTATo, supra; D1GESTO ITALIANO and Nuovo DIGESTO ITALIANO
(1937), "Consiglio di Stato"; Monographs in STUDI IN occASIONE DEL CENTENARIO
DEL CoNSIGLIO DI STATO (1931) (hereinafter cited STUDI); and in 2 ScRITTI
GIURIDICI IN ONORE DI RoMANo (1940) (hereinafter cited ScR1rn).
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Fascist-dominated,3 no important criticism has been directed against
the Council of State. Its prestige, which was very great before Fascism,
has not been substantially affected by the totalitarian reforms, and the
Council of State can probably be considered as the most significant
survival of an old institution in the new government. In 1931, the
regime celebrated the first centennial of the foundation of the Council
of State, emphasizing its present importance in the administration of
the c~untry; 4 and no substantial change of emphasis has taken place
since then. Problems of administration have proved too great an obstacle to revolutionary theories. Ironically enough, the Council, which
owes its origin to the principles of the French Revolution, seems
destined to endure the reaction of the blackshirts.
The explanation lies in the fact that the regime has preferred to
bring the Council within its sphere, rather than to eliminate so powerful and important an agency. By such tactics, it has attained several
objectives: (1) it has avoided shocking the Italian people, who respect
old traditions and institutions; (2) it has avoided a major conflict with
the administrative bureaucracy; (3) it has converted to its own use
the forces and values represented by the Council of State. For these
advantages, the regime has paid a price in the shape of concessions to
the retreating, but still not silenced, forces of legalistic individualism.5
The present situation can be better understood when the origin,
composition, and functions of the Council of State have been examined.

I
HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS OF THE COUNCIL

A. Origin
The Council of State originated in the consilium regis of the absolute king as the main advisory body to the government. The emphasis
3

Cf. FINER, MussoLINI's hALY 255 ff. (1935). The reform did not stop even
when the Chamber had been reduced to a mere rubberstamp as regards its legislative
functions. The name also had to disappear, in order to cut the last formal link with the
past and the despised democratic world. The latest development is the act on the
Chamber of Fasci and Guilds of January 19, 1939, No. 129. See discussion by Steiner,
"Fascist Italy's New Legislative System," 33 AM. PoL. Sex. REv. 456 (1939).
4
See, e.g., Romano (professor at Rome University and president of the Council),
"Le funzioni e i caratteri del Consiglio di Sta to," 1 STUDI 4 ( I 93 1), who characterized
the Council as a "universal and everlasting institution," adding that "there is no legal
system of any importance in which it is not known"-a generalization which the
Anglo-American and pre-Nazi German systems do not justify.
5
For a discussion of the Fascist legal philosophy, see Steiner, "The Fascist Conception of Law," 36 CoL. L. REv. 1267 (1936).
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has shifted in modern times from political to administrative functions. 6
Judicial functions, which are the subject of this paper,7 have been
added in comparatively recent times.
The later evolution of the Council began with a situation arising
in the young kingdom of Italy. The fundamental law of 1865, following a Belgian pattern, conferred jurisdiction upon the ordinary
courts over controversies concerning civil and political rights, even
when the administration is a party in interest. 8 But this jurisdiction has
been limited in its scope on the ground that the judiciary should not
encroach upon the executive in violation of the separation of powers.
Ordinary courts have not been allowed to set aside or modify administrative acts, and have been empowered only to refuse to enforce invalid
administrative regulations and adjudications in the particular situations
presented by the cases,9 or in proper situations to enter a judgment for
damages against the administration.1 ° Furthermore, ordinary courts
cannot pass upon administrative discretion.
The system established by this statute proved an insufficient safeguard for the citizen. Not only was the jurisdiction of ordinary courts
restricted by the limitations mentioned, but the controversies involving rights, which alone could be carried to the ordinary courts, omitted
the wide range of interests, which could be protected only by the action
of the administration itself. The movement for giving adequate protection to interests resulted in an act of 1889, which created a judicial
G In its modern form, the Council goes back to the law of August I 8, I 8 3 I. It
was reorganized in accordance with the principles of constitutional government by the
statute of October 30, 1859, No. 3707.
7
Although it would be interesting to consider also the administrative functions
of the Council, the subject of this paper has been limited to the judicial ones, not only
for considerations of space, but also because they offer a more striking illustration of
the problems concerning administrative justice in a totalitarian state.
8
Act of March 20, 1865, No. 2248, appendix E, which abolished the old administrative tribunals, with the exceptions of the Council of State and the Corte dei Conti.
The Belgian system established the general jurisdiction of ordinary courts in reaction
to the early French system of separate jurisdiction, which had left a bad record in
Belgium during the Napoleonic domination.
9
Arts. 4 and 5 of the act of March 20, 1865, No. 2248, appendix E. These
principles were derived from art. 107 of the Belgian Constitution of February 7, 1831.
To appreciate the results of this review in the case of regulations, it must be noted
that Italian law does not recognize the doctrine of stare decisis, and therefore any such
decision by the ordinary judge is of little value in another case arising under the same
regulation.
10
Italian law establishes the responsibility of the state in tort for actions of its
officials. For a thorough discussion of the legal background of this problem, see
Borchard, "Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L. J. 1, 129 (1924), 229
(1925), "Governmental Responsibility in Tort," 36 YALE L. J. 1, 757 (1936),
1039 (1937).
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section in the Council of State ( a second section was added in I 907) .11
Hence the distinction between interests (interessi legittimi) and
rights appears as the key to the whole system of Italian administrative
justice. By interests is meant private interests in a field in which the
administration is vested with discretionary powers.12 A typical example
is that of a license-holder, who has a right to the exclusive use of his
license against everybody else except the administration, which can
exercise discretion in modifying and revoking the license itself.
The distinction between rights and interests used as a demarcation
line between the jurisdiction of the Council and of ordinary courts
presented particular difficulties in some cases, for example, situations
arising in connection with civil service,18 in which rights and interests
are intermingled. To overcome this difficulty, the "exclusive jurisdiction," of the Council was created in 1923,14 thus conferring, in matters
enumerated by law,15 jurisdiction over rights upon the administrative
courts, to the exclusion of the ordinary judges.16

B. Organization and Personnel
The organization of the Council of State reflects the twofold character of the functions conferred upon it. 17 The advisory function is
11

Respectively, statutes of June 2, 1889, No. 6166, and August 17, 1907, No.

638.
12 For a criticism of the prevailing view, expounded by Piccardi, "La distinzione
fra diritto e interesse nel campo della giustizia amministrativa," 2 STUDI l 55 ff.
( l 93 l), see Amorth, "Figura giurdicia e contenuto del diritto subbiettivo affievolito,"
2 ScRxrn 201 ff. (1940).
18
In the present paper, civil service is meant to include any employee of the state,
provinces, communes, and other public bodies.
14 Legislative decree of December 30, 1923, No. 2840, which has been later
embodied in the basic law of June 26, 1924, No. 1054, consolidating all legislative
provisions on the Council of State. Legislative decrees (decreti legislatioi) are rulemaking decrees issued by the government upon delegation by parliament and having
the same force as a statute. The reform of 1923 has its origin in a parliamentary
proposal of 1916 (see the report explaining this proposal in Rxv. DxR. PUBBL.
1916.I.318) and cannot be considered typical of the regime. See ANDREADEs, LE
CONTENTIEUX ADMINISTRATIF DES ETATS MODERNS 206 (1934).
15 The exclusive jurisdiction of the Council includes further authorizations concerning public welfare institutions, decisions regarding their modification and status,
controversies affecting the public debt, financial responsibility of the state, provinces
and communes as to public health, particularly in connection with indigents, decisions
of the prefects regulating unhealthy or dangerous industries.
16 A serious hardship, however, was caused by the new system in that the complaint
with the Council must be filed within 60 days, whereas an action before the ordinary
courts may be brought within 30 years.
17 The following data are summarized from the aforementioned legislation as
modified by the emergency decree of February 9, 1939, No. 273. Emergency decrees
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vested in four sections and in the general assembly, which is composed
of all the members of the Council, including those serving in the judicial sections. The judicial function is conferred on two sections ( the
fourth and fifth) and on the plenary assembly. The judicial sections
are composed of a president and at least seven councillors; and every
decision must be agreed upon by the majority of the seven members.
The plenary assembly, which is called to settle conflicts between the holdings of the two sections,18 is composed of the president of the Council and
four councillors from each judicial section. Every year the government
transfers not fewer than two councillors and not more than four from
each judicial section to the advisory ones. This shifting is intended to insure the necessary continuity in the temper of the judicial sections, and at
the same time to give the councillors an opportunity to participate in
administrative action while serving in the advisory sections. As a
whole, and apart from its clerical staff, the Council is composed of
fifty-two councillors, one president, seven section presidents, five first
referees, and six referees. The referees can be assigned to the various
sections to perform the tasks of the councillors. The referees perform
the tasks of councillors, but they can vote only when substituting for
councillors or when acting as relators in a case.
All appointments to the Council are made by the cabinet on proposal of the prime minister. One-half of the vacancies among the councillors are filled by promoting referees with at least four years of
service. The referees are selected by means of a competitive examination among civil servants having law degrees. The other half of the
vacancies in the Council are filled by the appointment of administrative
o:fficials.19
, Extensive safeguards are provided for tenure of office. The coun( dec,·eti legge) are issued by the government on authority of the act of January 31,
1926, No. 100, art. 3 (2), and later of art. 18 of the act of January 19, 1939, No.
I 29. These decrees should be adopted when required by "necessity," and be approved
by parliament within a certain period, thus being formally embodied in a statute.
18
The need for this action is very limited; from 1931 to I 93 5 four matters only
were brought before the plenary assembly. Statistics of 2 IL CoNSIGLIO DI STATo NEL
QUINQUENNIO 1931-1935, RELAZIONE 1012-1013 (1939) (hereinafter citedCoNSIGLIO,
RELAZIONE).
19
A comparison with the French Conseil d'Etat shows that the Italian system
omits the extraordinary councillors (who, however, do not take part in the judicial
function), and the auditors, though the institution of the latter has been often advocated. Another difference lies in the fact that out of 124 members of the Conseil d'Etat
only 30 at maximum come from the administration. WALINE, MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE
DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 2d ed., 76 (1939). For the most recent study of the French
system, see Riesenfeld, "The French System of Administrative Justice; A Model for
American Law?" 18 BosT. UNIV. L. REV. 48, 400, 715 (1938).
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cillors must retire at seventy years of age, and cannot be transferred
to another office except with their assent. They can be removed by
the government for cause upon deliberation of the cabinet, and upon
advice of the general assembly of the Council itself. But the fact that
this advice is not binding greatly reduces the value of this safeguard.
In short, the composition of the Council of State deserves praise in
that expertness is insured, but is open to criticism in that the provisions
for the independence of the councillors are inadequate. No similar conclusion can be reached concerning the provincial administrative commissions ( Giunte Provinciali A mministrative), which exercise a number
of administrative functions in addition to their capacity as administrative
courts of first instance.20 The explanation for the strong criticisms
directed against their judicial work lies mainly in the fact that their
organization and personnel do not insure separation of functions and
independence from the executive. The judicial functions are only a
part-time occupation for the members of these commissions, who are
often supposed to pass judgment upon acts of the prefect, chief administrative authority in the province and himself president of the commission.21
C. Requisites to Jurisdiction
The Council of State, in its judicial capacity, is both a court of
original jurisdiction over controversies between citizens and the central
administration and a court of appeal in controversies between citizens
and local administrations, the latter controversies being dealt with by
the provincial administrative commissions in first instance. It must be
stressed that the greatest number of controversies concerns civil service.22 Against the decisions of the Council, appeal may be taken to the
Court of Cassation, in bane, only for lack of jurisdiction of the Council
ratione materiae.28
20
The basic law concerning these commissions is the consolidating legislative
decree of June 26, 1924, No. 1058, as modified by the legislative decree of March
31, 1934, No. 383, arts. 25-29, 405, and May 19, 1938, No. 993.
21
See, e.g., Lessona, "Gli sviluppi necessari della giustizia amministrativa," Riv.
DIR. PUBBL. 1931.I.473; Jemolo, "Per una riforma delle leggi sulla giustizia amministrativa," Riv. DIR. PuBBL. 1932.I.45.
22
In the year 1929, 791 cases related to public service, of a total of 1170 decided.
Another 42 cases concerned professions controlled by the administration. These statistics are borrowed from La Torre (a councillor), "II sistema delle prove davanti al
Consiglio di Stato," 3 STUDI 524 (1931). For a general discussion of the Italian civil
service, see Cole, "Italy's Fascist Bureaucracy," 32 AM. PoL. Sex. REV. 1143 (1938).
28
This is another substantial difference between the Italian and the French systems, as in the latter appeals from the decisions of the Council are taken to a special
judicial body, the Tribunal of Conflicts, composed of members both of the Council
and of the Court of Cassation.
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The jurisdiction of the administrative courts rests upon two requisites: (I) an administrative act, and ( 2) an interest aggrieved thereby. 2

4,

I.

The Administrative Act

The concept of administrative act is very broad,25 since it includes both general and special acts of any administrative authority
from a minister to a podesta of a village. That is to say, the same type
of review is provided for both regulations and administrative adjudications. However, statistics published by the Council regarding its
decisions show that a much greater number of protests have been upheld by the fifth section than by the fourth. 26 As the latter generally
deals with matters concerning the state administration and the former
with matters concerning other public administrations, an interesting
question arises as to whether this is a symptom of a bias of the Council
in favor of the state, or whether administrative acts of the state administration comply with legal requirements to a greater extent than do
acts of other public administrations.
The typical administrative act emanates from an administrative
authority in the exercise of an administrative function. Hence no review can be had of statutes or regulations having the force of statute.21
Similarly, acts by administrative authorities, but judicial in their nature,
24 To these requisites the following conditions must be added: the action must be
brought within 60 days from the notification of the final act; the complainant must
not have renounced the remedy or acquiesced in the adjudication, nor filed an extraordinary recourse to the King. The latter rule is explained by the fact that the decision
upon the "extraordinary recourse" is taken upon the advice of the general assembly
of the Council, which includes also councillors of the judicial sections. To allow a
recourse to the judicial sections would make possible a conflict within the branches of
the Council.
25
Question has been made whether the existence of an administrative act complained of is a necessary prerequisite also to the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Council, and the affirmative has been finally agreed upon both by the Council and the Court
of Cassation, on the basis of a study made by the respective presidents, Romano and
D'Amelio, "I contatti giurisdizionali della Corte di Cassazione e del Consiglio di Stato,"
Riv. DIR. PuBBL. 1929.I.181.
26
In the years 1931-1935, the fourth section upheld 475 recourses out of 1495
(31.77%), rejected 690 on the merits (46.15%), and 330 on procedural grounds
(22.07%). The corresponding figures for the fifth section are: 3479 recourses decided;
2047 upheld (58.83%), 830 rejected on the merits (23.85%), and 602 on procedural grounds ( l 7. 3 2 %) . These statistics have been compiled on the basis of the data
published in 2 CoNSIGLIO, RELAZIONE 931-1009 (1939).
27
Such are emergency and legislative decrees. The limited review which is allowed as to the latter is discussed below.
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are not reviewable by the Council; 28 and administrative acts of an
authority outside the administration are generally excluded from the
Council's jurisdiction.29
To be reviewable by the Council, administrative acts must meet
another general requirement: they must be final ( definitivi). This
qualification makes recourse to the Council possible only after exhaustion of the remedies within the administration itself, thus giving the
administration an opportunity to correct its errors before the administrative courts step in.80 The act which can be challenged in the administrative court, therefore, is either the decision taken by a superior
administrative authority after recourse to it,81 or the original act itself,
if no such preliminary remedy is allowed by law.82
To the rule that all administrative acts are reviewable by the
Council, two exceptions have been established. One is represented by
the category of "acts of government," and the other by a number of
statutory provisions excluding specific acts from judicial review by the
Council. Both of these categories will be considered in detail below.
28
As a rule such acts are reviewable on appeal to the Court of Cassation, in bane,
which has general appellate jurisdiction over all decisions of special judicial bodies. A
number of exceptions to this rule takes place in force of statutory provisions conferring
judicial power over ministers. These cases are reported in Ragnisco, "II ministrogiudice," 2 ScRITTI 987 ( I 940). It is interesting to note that in the French system
this appellate jurisdiction has been conferred upon the Conseil d' Etat.
29
It has been held, however, that the appointment and removal by the president
of a court of a city clerk as secretary to a justice of the peace are reviewable administrative acts; the judicial authority has been considered to have acted in an administrative capacity. Council of State, 4th sec., December 20, 1939, Mazzone v. Presidente
del tribunale di Napoli, Riv. DIR. PUBBL. 1940.II.5.
8
From the point of view of the complainant this recourse offers limited advantages, because, although very cheap, it is a remedy deprived of safeguards and rarely
successful. It represents a necessary step for going before the Council, and must, therefore, be distinguished from the extraordinary recourse which is an alternatirle remedy
to the recourse to the judicial sections of the Council. Cf. supra, note 24.
81
A difficulty arose in those cases in which the administration remained inert in
regard to the complaint filed with it, thus depriving petitioner of the final act to be
appealed to the Council. In order to ameliorate this situation, the Council laid down
the rule that the silence maintained by the administration even upon further notice
by the complainant should be deemed an equivalent to a rejection of the recourse and
that, as such, it entitles petitioner to appeal to the Council. It is noteworthy that this
liberal principle received legislative confirmation, and is now embodied in art. 5 of
the legislative decree of March 5, 1934, No. 363.
82
The problem of when an act is "final" is debatable in various situations, and
therefore causes a great deal of litigation. To avoid undue hardship to petitioner, the
act of February 8, 1925, No. 88, has empowered the Council in case of excusable error
to give a short postponement to the complainant in order that he might resort to the
administrative remedy first.

°
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The Interest Aggrieved

The second requisite for the jurisdiction of the Council of
State is that an interest be aggrieved by the administrative act.33 Moreover, the interest which opens the road to the review must be "individual" and "present." The first qualification means that no action can
be brought by citizens for the protection of the public interest as such.
But an interest may also exist in persons other than those subject to the
administrative act. For example, a competitor of a dealer to whom a
license has been granted has been recognized as entitled to attack the
grant.34
By the qualification that the interest must be "present" is meant
that a future interest is not entitled to judicial protection. Resort to the
courts is premature when the act sought to be reviewed affects the complainant adversely only on the contingency of future administrative
action, as in the case of preparatory acts 35 such as proposals, recommendations, advisory opinions, and preliminary acts in a public competition.36
On a similar basis, the Council has denied review of general regulations until the complainant is affected by a specific adjudication made
under the general regulation. This principle admits of exceptions in
particular situations in which the regulation occasions immediate
prejudice to the individual interest. Hence, it has been held that an
officeholder has a present interest to seek review of a regulation suppressing his office,87 and similarly that a landowner may attack a housing regulation imposing immediate duties upon him.38
83
Complainant may be an individual as well as a local autonomous body, such as a
commune or province.
8
" Council of State, 5th sec. July 18, 1939, Torre v. Prefetto di Alessandria, Riv.
AMM. 1940.133; 2 CoNSIGLio, RELAZIONE 768 (1939) (interest in an established
pharmacist to attack a new pharmacist license).
85 In some cases, however, preparatory acts may aggrieve the individual interest,
thus opening the way to judicial review. Council of State, 4th sec., December 30, 1938,
Capece Minutolo v. Comune di Napoli, FoRo IT. 1939.III.17.
36
Council of State, 5th sec., December 29, 1937, Pagella v. Ministero dell'lnterno,
FoRo AMMIN. 1938.l.2.140 (advisory acts). For other situations, see 2 CoNSIGLio,
RELAZIONE 771-775 (1939). In some of these cases, the administrative act may not be
".final" in the sense explained above, but also the institution of the preliminary administrative remedy is precluded by the lack of a present interest in the complainant.
37 Council of State, 5th sec., March 9, 1937, Carlino v. Governatorato di Roma,
GmR IT. 1938.III.12.
·
88
Council of State, 4th sec., April 14, 1939, Boretti v. Ministero dei lavori
pubblici, FoRo IT. 1939.III.266. Other situations are cited in 2 CoNSIGLio, RELAZIONE
769-770 (1939).

1942]

FASCIST ADMINISTRATIVE COURTS

As a whole, these standards developed by the Council are fairly
liberal, and their flexibility makes it possible to give considerable effect
to the circumstances of each case.

D. Scope of Judicial Review
r. Legality of Administrative Acts
The scope of the review of administrative acts by the Council is
generally limited as to law and fact, but in an enumerated list of cases
the expediency and advisability of administrative action is subject to
full review. The general clause of the basic law empowers the Council to annul an act, if satisfied that it is unlawful. It cannot modify the
unlawful act, nor issue a new act in its place; 39 once the act has been
set aside, it is for the administration to take further positive action in
compliance with the judicial decision.4' 0
A decision of the Council annulling a regulation has effect ultra
partes.41 But if the Council annuls an adjudicatory act, the administration has no duty to extend the decision to other persons in the same
situation as the successful complainant.42 Recourse to the administrative
courts is insufficient, in itself, to stay the execution of the action complained of. But discretionary power is vested in the administrative
tribunals to issue a sort of temporary injunction, on petition of the
aggrieved party. The requirements are that the enforcing of the ad39
It has been held, however, that the Council has power to rectify the act
complained of. Council of State, 5th sec. January I 5, 1932, Maellare v. Comune di
Modugno, FoRo IT. 1932.III.85 (correction of the date of removal of a public
servant).
40
This jurisdiction is similar to the French contentieux d' t1nnulation, which 2
GooDNow, CoMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 232 (1893) and FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE PoWERs OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 232 (1928), compared with the
American review on certiorari.
41
Some authors see an exception to this rule in the case where the annulment is
based on grounds particular to the complainant and not objective. RANELLETI'I, LE
GUARENTIGIE DELLA GIUSTIZIA NELLA PUBBLICA AMMINISTRAZIONE, 5th ed., 5 I I
(1936); CoDACCI-PISANELLI, L'ANNULLAMENTO DEGLI ATI'I AMMINISTRATIVI 256
(1939). Contra, 2 ZANOBINI, CoRso DI DIRITTO AMMINISTRATIVO 375 (1939).
42
The Council upheld the contention of the administration that some administrative acts are only apparently of a general character, for they really consist of a number
of specific adjudications. Thus the extension ultra partes of a decision annulling the
dissolution of a police corps has been refused, upon the argument that this administrative act consists of several acts of dismissal which should have been attacked by each
individual party. 2 CoNSIGLio, RELAZIONE 880 (1939). Although this judicial trend
met the approval of the doctrine, the point seems open to doubts.

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 40

ministrative act cause irremediable damage to the complainant, and
that his petition be based upon prima facie sound legal grounds.48
According to the statutory formula, the Council may set aside or
annul an administrative act as illegal on the following grounds: "lack
of authority" (incompetenza ), "excess of power" (eccesso di potere ),
and "violation of the law" ( violazione di legge ).44
Lack of authority occurs when an act is issued by an official other
than the one upon whom the power has been conferred.45 Under this
heading, which comes close to the concept of ultra vires, any defect in
the composition of the public authority is also included, for example,
irregular composition of a commission.46 Similarly, the Council sets
aside a decree purporting to be based upon legislative delegation if it is
issued without the required deliberation of the cabinet and the advice
of the advisory branch of the Council.47 To be sure, no court in Italy
can review the standards of legislative delegation and their sufficiency,
because to do so is deemed to be an encroachment upon the legislative
function, but the Council can assert its jurisdiction in cases of noncompliance on the part of the executive with the formalities required by
the act of delegation.48
":Violation of the law" is a broad formula which, however, must be
understood in a narrow meaning; precisely it includes all cases of
illegality other than those which come under the categories of lack
of authority and excess of power. Typical examples are violations of
48 The practice of conferring suspensive effect upon the appeal occurs much more
f!equently in Italy than in France. As to the latter, see Conseil d'Etat, July 17, 1936,
Croix de Feu, 54 REv. DR01T PuBL, 332 (1937). For a discussion of the Italian practice, see Rocco, "ll rimedio della sospenione degli atti amministrativi impugnati
dimenzi al Consiglio di Stato," 2 ScRI'ITI 517-565 (1940).
44 Art. 26 of the basic law of June 26, 1924, No. 1054. This general clause has
been restricted by some statutes concerning particular fields.
45
Council of State, 4th sec., January 13, 1940, Grasso v. Ministero della Marina,
Riv. Dm. PuBBL. I 940.Il. 77 ( decision signed by an official instead of by undersecretary
of the navy); 4th sec., June 16, 1937, Lacertosa v. Ministero dell'educazione nazionale, FoRo IT. 1938.III.55 (act issued by the minister of national education instead of
by a local authority) •
46 Council of State, 4th sec., October 14, 1939, Citerni v. Ministero della guerra,
Rxv. Dm. PuBBL. 1940.Il.21.
47 Council of State, 4th sec., December 12, 1939, Raiola v. Ministero delle finanze,
Rxv. Dm. PuBBL. 1940.II.23. Contra, but without adequate justification, 2 ZANoBINI,
CoRSo DI DIRITI"o AMMINISTRATivo 211 (1939). The French Conseil d'Etat does not
exercise any review of decrets-lois. November 29, 1935, Union des vehicules industriels,
Sirey 1936.3.126.
48 Council of State, 4th sec., April 26, 1939, Morra v. Ministero di agricoltura,
FoRo IT. 1939.III.227.
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the prescribed form, although infringement of only a slight formality
will not cause annulment of the act.49 An important case of "violation"
occurs when there is lack of the motivation required by the statute
under which the act is issued,50 or by a principle established by the
Council's decisions. 51
Decisions of the Council of State regarding the excess of power
deserve special consideration, since they show a very interesting development.52 Only some of the most important situations can be referred
to here:
(a) Misapplication of power occurs when the act is issued for purposes other than those for which the power was granted. In these cases,
there is a motivation, but either it is not the one which could justify the
use of the power exercised, or it is simply untrue. The Italian name
sviamento di potere which indicates these cases is an exact translation of
the French detournement de pouvoir; in fact, the French jurisprudence
on the matter has been a model for the Italian Council of State for a
long time. This review concerns particularly the discretionary powers
of the administration. Discretion is not arbitrariness. The freedom
of determination which is allowed to the official for the expedient and
efficient performing of its functions must be guided by the particular
public interest pursued by the statute. 58 Thus the Council of State
annuls actions of the administration if the interest pursued is a mere
private one. This is, for example, the case of a decree of expropriation
49

Council of State, 5th sec., February 17, 1937, Molteni v. Prefetto di Milano,
FoRo AMMIN. 1937.I.2.111. On these questions, see RAvA, LA CoNVALIDA DEGLI
ATrI AMMINISTRATIVI 126 ff. (1937).
5
Council of State, 4th sec., March 31, 1939, Vairo v. Ministero dell'Africa
italiana, FoRo IT. 1939.III.130.
51 These include disciplinary measures, revocations and annulments of previous
administrative acts, and generally all discretionary decisions in order to make the judicial
review possible. In the latter case, however, the minimum of motivation required is
limited to the reference to the statutory authority upon which the act is based, and to
the declaration that the facts have been evaluated. 2 CoNSIGLio, RELAZIONE 17 (1939).
Cf. IAccARINo, STUDI SULLA MOTIVAZIONE (1933).
52 Specific studies on the matter are: CoDACCI-PISANELLI, L'EccEsso DI POTERE
NEL CONTENZIOSO AMMINISTRAT!VO SCRITrI DI DIRITT0 PUBBLICO ( I 900) ( and Pappalardo, "L'eccesso di potere 'amministrativo,'" 2 STuDI 429 (1931).
58
''Whether the power is one to license, or one to order, discretion should always
be guided by considerations appropriate to the subject matter; and other considerations
being illegitimate, the exercise of a "discretion based upon them constitutes an error
of law." FREUND, ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OVER PERSONS AND PROPERTY 296 (1928).
"Discretion does not mean freedom to pursue any public interest." Marx, "Comparative
Administrative Law: A Note on Review of Discretion,'' 87 UNIV. PA. L. REY. 954
at 961 (1939).
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for public utility which was in fact occasioned by private interests.Gel
The following are examples of cases in which an act has been annulled
because of pursuance of a public interest different from the one which
the law had envisaged: dismissal of a public servant, ostensibly in the
interest of the service, while the true underlying reason is a disciplinary
one, and no disciplinary procedure has been complied with; 55 dissolution of an intermunicipal veterinary consortium, when the hidden purpose of the act is to oust the man in charge. 56
Misapplication of power has been recognized in cases of disparity
of treatment on the part of the administration. The Council has followed this illuminating line of thought: when an advantage granted
to some is refused to others who find themselves in the same situation,
the action of the administrative in respect to the latter appears to be
inspired, not by those reasons of service for which the power has been
,conferred upon it, but by extraneous reasons, which lead to misuse of
power. 57
(b) Other interesting situations in which the Council annuls administrative acts for excess of power are lack of logical nexus between
grounds and decisions. A striking illustration of this principle is the
appointment by a public administration of a medical doctor to a position
of general physician, because--so reads the appointment-he "had
applied himself exclusively to internal medicine." 58 A similar situation
arises when the administration issues two contradictory acts concerning
the same person, within a short time and without any justification for
the change. Such is the case of an officer duly qualified for a promotion,
but subsequently given a contrary rating. 59
( c) Excess of power occurs again when the administration disregards the right of defense of the public servant. A leading decision
5
"' Council of State, 4th sec., May 22, 1926, Grillo v. Prefetto di Macerata,
Folio AMMIN. 1926.I.313.
55
Council of State, 4th sec., April 14, 1939, Lo Prieno v. Ministero della marina,
FoRo IT. 1939.III.249; 4th sec., March 31, 1939, Guareschi v. Ministero delle finanze,
id. 251.
56
Council of State, 5th sec., July 13, 1937, Cossu v. Ministero dell' interno,
FoRo IT. 1938.III.13.
57
Council of State, 4th sec., December 16, 1927, Sardu v. Ministero della guerra,
FoRo AMMIN. 1928.I.1.67. As mentioned above, the administration has no duty to
extend the effects of a Council's decision ultra partes. But when it has done so in
respect to some, it is misuse of power to refuse equal treatment to others. Council of
State, 4th sec., June 6, 1930, FoRo AMMIN. 1930.I.1.182.
58
Council of State, 5th sec., December 5, 1939, Cimmino v. Cassa di soccorso
azienda tramviaria, Riv. DIR." PuBBL. 1940.II.69 (italics supplied).
59
Council of State, 4th sec., February 16, 1938, Pani v. Ministero della marina,
GmR. IT. 1938.III.88.
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of the Council has held that a disciplinary procedure lacking the essential guarantees of adequate notice and opportunity for the individual to
be heard is contrary to the general principles of the law, and constitutes
excess of power.60
( d) Other situations in which the Council annuls administrative
acts for excess of power occur because of misdetermination of the facts.
In a leading case, the Council held that this ground of annulment applies when the facts upon which the administration purports to base
its action are found to be untrue. 61
2. Fact Determination
For a review of the facts, the administrative judge may order the
bringing of new evidence, such as the exhibition of documents. He may
also request explanations from the agency whose act is attacked, and
order it to verify facts and submit a report on them. These powers of
review can be exercised by the administrative courts when the evidence
resulting from the documents presented by the parties is incomplete,
or when the facts stated are in conflict with the documents submitted.62
In their review of the facts, the administrative courts have often
rejected the claim of the administration that the matter is within its
discretionary powers. This question arose, e.g., in a recent case in which
the administration was vested with discretionary power to grant licenses
for the establishment of "new" industrial plants, in the light of the
needs of the public interest as determined by the present conditions of
the market, of local and of general production, and of employment.
The administration's claim that it also had discretion to determine
whether a plant, temporarily closed, was or was not to be considered
"new," was rejected by the Council, which held that the point was one
of fact in which no discretion had been conferred upon the agency. 63
6

°

Council of State, 4th sec., December 21, 1923, Amelio v. Ministero della
giustizia, GxuR. IT. 1924.III.106.
61
Council of State, 4th sec., July 30, 1931, Comune di Brigalia v. Prefetto di
Cuneo, Riv. AMMIN. 1931.836.
62
Respectively as to the Council and the provincial administrative commissions,
arts. 44 and 14 of the basic laws of June 26, 1924, Nos. 1054 and 1058. For some
criticisms of these rules, see La Torre, "11 sistema delle prove davanti al Consiglio di
Stato," 3 STUDI 516-517 (1931). In matters of evidence, administrative courts have
broader powers than ordinary courts, which can pass only upon the facts as supplied by
the parties, thus leaving burden of proof and risk of nonpersuasion as the exclusive
spring. In contrast, the administrative process is dominated by the inquisitional principle, requiring the courts to take positive action and. to order necessary evidence to be
brought in.
68
Council of State, 4th sec., November 9, 1938, Spadaccio v. Ministero delle
corporazioni, FoRo IT. 1939.III.19.
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In the field of administrative discretion, review of the facts by
the Council is of an exceptional character,64 and is limited to the cases
of a striking clash between facts and findings of the agency. Thus the
discretionary power vested in the administration to determine which
piece of property is appropriate for expropriation is subject to judicial
review only if the sacrifice of the private interest is openly arbitrary and
the real facts as to suitability conflict with the administrative findings. 05

3. Administrative Expediency
While review as to legality of administrative action is within the
general jurisdiction of the Council of State, and may be excluded only
by express and clear statutory provision, a full review of administrative expediency is allowed only in the particular cases enumerated by
the statute. Twenty-two of these are indicated by the basic law concerning the Council of State.66 They include, among others, matters
of public debt, local taxation, boundaries between municipalities, public
welfare institutions, public works, public lands, decisions concerning
unhealthy and dangerous industries, and actions directed to compel the
administrative authorities to conform themselves to the judgment of
ordinary courts which have recognized the infringment of a civil or
political ,right. 67 It must be noted, however, that this jurisdiction is in
fact concerned mostly with controversies between public servants and
public bodies, especially local. In the year 1929, these suits accounted
for 459 cases of the 507 in which the Council was called upon to exercise full review of administrative discretion and expediency. 68
In these cases, the jurisdiction of the Council consists of a broader
review of the determination of facts and findings of the administrative
authorities. There is a full review of the administrative discretion, and
the Council can pass upon problems of expediency and wisdom of administrative action; hence the Council has been described as a court of
equity. To enable the administrative courts to exercise this review,
broad authority has been conferred upon them to order any means of
'\

64 Council of State, 4th sec., January I, 1940, Scalabroni v. Orfanotrofio Cantalamessa, Riv. DIR. PuBBL. 1940.II.121.
65
Council of State, 5th sec., December 22, 1937, Solari v. Prefetto di Genova,
Riv. DIR. PUBBL. 1938.II.201; 5th sec., June IO, 1932, Azzini v. Ministero dell'interno, Riv. DIR. PuBBL. 1932.II.780.
66
Arts. 27 and 29, Act of June 26, 1924, No. 1054.
67
For a thorough discussion of this interesting topic, see Guicciardi, "L'obbligo
dell'autorita amministrativa di conformarsi al giudicato dei tribunali," 2 ScRl'ITI 395433 (1940).
.
68
See La Torre, "Il sistema delle prove davanti al Consiglio di Stato," 3 STUDI
524 (1931).
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evidence.69 It is worthy of notice that these powers may be exercised
even if the findings of the administration are not contradicted by the
documents produced by the parties.70
But if the act is unlawful, the review as to its expediency or wisdom
may not be continued, because the Council must annul any act which
it has found unlawful. Broader authority is exercised in the case of an
illegal negative act, for the Council will issue the positive act. An example is furnished by the case of judicial invalidation of a refusal by the
administration to authorize a public body to accept a legacy. The Council itself issued the authorization.71 Generally, however, the Council
reforms the act complained of, without issuing an act of different character. In a leading case, it inserted a new clause in the charter of a
welfare institution. 72
This jurisdiction of the Council is considered the exercise of administrative action, carried out under the judicial guarantees of hearing
and perusal of evidence. To sum up, there are two main features of this
jurisdiction: (a) the full examination of the administrative discretion
and expediency; and (b) the power to modify, and even to issue another act in place of the one complained of, i.e., reformation power.73
The actual exercise of these powers by the Council is, however, marked
by a definite restraint.

II
ADAPTATION OF THE CouNCIL TO FASCISM

A. Fascist Policies
It is interesting to consider both the methods employed by the
Fascist regime to bring the administrative courts within its sphere of
action and the extent to which it has succeeded.'4 The regime brought
to bear upon the Council of State various methods of pressure adverse
69

Art. 44 (2), Act of June 26, 1924, No. 1054.

° Council of State, 5th sec., July 26, 1917, Comune di Napoli v. Messina, G1uST.

7

1917.237.
Council of State, 5th sec., September 12, 1918, Comune di Chamois v. Prefetto di Torino, GiuST. AMMIN. 1918.277.
72
Council of State, 5th sec., December II, 1931, Ronzoni v. Ministero dell'interno, FoRo IT. 1932.III.69.
73
Although the first power is a prerequisite to the second, nevertheless it seems
misleading to point to the latter as to the unique characteristic of this jurisdiction, as do
Fagiolari, "La giurisdizione di merito del Consiglio di Stato," 3 STUDI 81 (1931),
and BoNNARD, LE CONTROLE JURIDICTIONNEL DE L'ADMINISTRATION 195,207 (1934).
74
SPENCER, GoVERNMENT AND Pouucs OF ITALY 227 (1932), affirms that
the French Council of State provides a better protection for the citizens than the
Italian counterpart. How far a similar statement would apply to pre-Fascist Italy is
a doubtful question.
AMMIN.
71
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to its members and functions. By means of political action, as well as
of new statutory provisions, it insured elimination of opponents, appointment of party members, control by the prime minister, and, last
but not least, unreviewability by the Council of the most important and
delicate administrative actions.
Drastic steps were deemed necessary to eliminate those councillors
whose record seemed too dangerous for the regime; and this was accomplished by a statute authorizing removal, within a limited period,
of councillors for reasons of political incompatibility with the regime. 75
Once the strongest opponents of the regime had been crushed, the
softening of the others was easily contrived. 76 Later, membership in the
Fascist party was officially made a prerequisite to appointment to the
civil service, from which the councillors are ultimately selected.11
In this connection it is proper to remember that all members of the
Fascist party are bound by an oath of fidelity to execute the orders of
the Duce without discussion. Finally, since 1931, the prime minister
has taken over the functions of the minister of interior concerning the
Council and has been directly in charge of the appointment of councillors. 78
As for the functions of the Council, the policy of the regime has
been to eliminate any possibility of interference by the Council with
major political policies, and to leave the Council free to check minor
abuses in the conduct of administration. Thus two objectives have been
reached. On the one hand, substantial freedom has been insured to the
administration in important issues. On the other hand, the guaranty of
justice in minor matters not only is useful dust thrown into the eyes
of the people,79 but also it represents an effective safeguard for a civil
75 Emergency decree of January 9, 1927, No. 16. It must be recalled that until
the very end of 1925 the Fascists did not eliminate the parliamentary form of government. Some additional softening was probably considered necessary before taking
such a drastic and open step against this highly respected and powerful agency.
76
Cf. MUNRO, THE GovERNMENTS OF EUROPE, 3d ed., 712 (1938).
77 Decrees of the prime minister of December 17, 1932, and December 12,
1933; emergency decree of June 1, 1933, No. 641.
78 Decree of August 21, 1931, No. 1030, which makes the Council directly
dependent from the prime minister. Fascist writers praise this measure, for it made
the Council independent of the various ministers. 3 ZANOBINI, CoRSo DI DIRITTO
AMMINISTRATivo 229 (1939). They do not tell, however, of the influence that the
prime minister cannot fail to exercise upon the Council.
79 This claim that the Fascist state is a state of law occasions curious statements,
such as the following, contained in 2 CONSIGLIO, RELAZIONE 735 (1939): "the judicial
function directed to review the lawfulness of the administrative function has remarkable importance even in the Fascist state" (emphasis added). But the humour of this
conclusion is certainly involuntary!
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service composed of men who belong to the new regime and are interested in the preservation of their rights and privileges of tenure, rating,
and the like.
The curbing of the rule of general reviewability of administrative
acts has been carried out by extending the exceptions to the principle.
The category of "acts of government" known to pre-Fascist Italy,8°
as well as abroad 81 has been enlarged, under pressure of the administration, and a broad definition has been substituted for an enumeration
of the specific acts recognized by the Council as "acts of government."
Thus new applications and cases may be easily introduced. "Acts of
government" are those performed pursuant to the supreme interests
of the state.
Since France is the country in which the principles of "acts of government" was first established,82 it is interesting to stress the contrast
between the French and the Italian approach to the problem. France
has attempted to avoid the dangers of a general formula, which would
establish "reason of state" in the legal system, and has approved the
restrictive trend maintained by the Conseil d'Etat in this respect. 88 The
most important illustrations in France have been: acts connected with
the relations between government and Parliament (convocation, adjournment and dissolution), acts of grace, acts declaring a state of
siege, acts of war, acts of international relations (negotiation and ratification of treaties), acts of colonial governors modifying the status of
their territories, annexation of territory, and establishment of protectorates.
80

Originally art, 24 of the decree of June 2, 1889, No. 6166; now art. 31
of the basic law of June 26, 1924, No. 1054.
81
The parallel between "acts of government" and the American political questions
has been often made. As to the latest German theories, see FRAENKEL, THE DuAL
STATE (1941).
82
Laun, "Rapport sur les actes de gouvernement," 2 ANNUAIRE DE L'INSTITUT
DE DR0IT PUBLIC 87 (1931).
ss HAURiou, PMCis DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 12th ed., 418 (1933); APPLETON, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU CONTENTIEUX ADMINlSTRATIF 29 (1927); 3 j:ezE,
LES PRINCIPES GENERAUX DU DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 2d ed., 394 ff. (1939); WALINE,
MANUEL ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 2d ed., 120 ff. (1939). The examples given in the text are those of RoLLANn, PRECIS DE DROIT ADMINISTRATIF, 7th
ed., Nos. 88-89 (1938). For a tentative definition of "acts of government," see DuEZ,
LES ACTES DE GOUVERNEMENT 24, 86, 38 ff. (1935). The French tendency was followed in Italy by SALANDRA, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA NEI GOVERNEI LIBERI 808
(1904), and, to some extent, by Liuzzi, "Sulla nozione degli atti di governo," FoRo
AMMIN, 1927.IV.63. On the general problem, see recently Guicciardi, "L'atto politico," 2 ARcH. DIR. PUBBL. 255, 486 (1937), whose original conclusions are not
accepted by the courts.
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To the similar list of cases in which the Italian Council of State has
recognized the existence of "acts of government," new situations are
now being added under the new Fascist principles. A landmark in this
trend is the Sokol case,84 in which the dissolution by the government
of a private gymnastic society was held unreviewable as an "act of
government" directed toward curbing foreign propaganda, in the
supreme interest of the state.
A second means of circumventing judicial review by the Council
has been the enactment of statutory provisions excluding specific administrative acts from review. Such provisions comprise a wide range
of cases, such as suspension and removal of the heads of local administrations, exclusion of applicants from public competitions for reasons
of expediency, transfers of elementary teachers, and determinations
of compulsory contributions of workers and employers to their guilds.85
Here, obviously, is a strong means of control in the hands of the
totalitarian system, as well as one of the most dangerous opportunities
84
Council of State, 4th sec., December 28, 1926, Societa ginnastica Sokol v.
Ministero dell'interno, FoRo AMMIN. 1927.I.1.118.
85
Suspension and removal of the podesta; removal of the president and vicepresident of the province; appointment, suspension and dissolution of the city council
(consulta); dissolution of the provincial council: arts. 49, 113, 66, 76, and 125 of the
legislative decree of March 3, 1934, No. 383. Dissolution of the corporate provincial
council: art. 65 of the legislative decree of September 20, 1934, No. 2011. Exclusion,
for reasons of expediency, of an applicant to a public competition: art. 1 of the legislative decree of Dec. 30, 1923, No. 2960; in the field of education: art. 24 of the
decree of Jan. 27, 1933, No. 153, and art. 75 of the legislative decree of Aug. 31,
1933, No. I 592. Transfer of elementary teachers: art. 4 of the emergency decree of
Sept. 26, 1935, No. 1866. Determinations of the compulsory contributions to guilds:
decree of Dec. 1, 1930, No. 1644, arts. 26(4) and (6), 88, 105, and for another
case art. 1 I 2 of the same decree. And further, decisions of the provincial administrative commissions (in their nonjudicial function) concerning municipalities declared
"resort places": art. 9 of the emergency decree of April I 5, 1926, No. 765. Decrees
regarding the merging of welfare institutions into the municipal welfare body: art.
7 of the act of June 3, 1937, No. 847. Decrees of the minister of finance resolving
government contracts: art. 7 of the legislative decree of Jan. 18, 1923, No. 94. Negative
decisions in matters of military rewards: art. 13 of the decree of Nov. 4, 1932, No.
1423. Decisions concerning finance of local communities: decree of Sept. 14, 1931, No.
1175, art. 323. In matters of taxation: emergency decree of Dec. 3, 1934, No. 1951,
art. 4(2), and April 20, 1933, No. 332, art. 4. In matters of public works: decrees of
Jan. 18,-1923, No. 106, art. 7, July 21, 1927, No. 1316, June 21, 1938, No. 1296,
and February 3, 1938, No. 591. Decisions concerning military servitudes: act of
Dec. 20, 1932, No. 1894, art. 4. Decisions concerning the application of the racial
laws: emergency decrees of Sept. 7, 1938, No. 1381, art. 5, and Nov. 17, 1938, No.
1728, art. 26. Decisions regarding utilization of lignites: emergency decree of April
5, 1928, No. 847, art. 3.
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for abuse. To put it in the effective words of a great Italian liberal
and administrative lawyer:
"by the exclusion of every judicial remedy, the legal system annuls
itself, because one cannot understand the idea of a right or wrong
without an authority able to declare on which side is the one or
the other." 86
Part of the same development is the substitution of administrative
discretion for the rule of criminal law in relation to many aspects of
personal liberty. Both in connection with a criminal indictment 87 and
apart from it,88 the most sweeping discretionary powers to restrict personal liberty have been conferred upon the administration. This is done
by police measures, which lack judicial safeguards because of their
alleged administrative nature. These actions are reviewable by higher
officials, but are not considered administrative acts for purposes of review by the Council of State.

B. Resistance by the Council
On the other side of the picture, it is interesting to note the reaction of the Council of State, which has been zealous in attempting to
maintain its jurisdiction and to reduce the scope of encroachment upon
its powers. In a great number of cases, the Council has rejected the
contention of the administration that an act complained of was an "act
of government," and as such exempt from review. Thus it has often
required affirmative legislation for the regime to work its will.
A limited sampling 89 reveals that the Council of State has rejected
the claim of the administration and has upheld its right of review in
cases concerning emergency rent regulations,9° an order for reconstruction of a cathedral,91 removal of a civil servant for reasons of political
incompatibility with the regime,92 reinstatement by the minister of
86

Orlando, "Un caso di conflitto fra Cassazione e Consiglio di Stato," FoRo IT.
1936.I.737. The technical character of the review and the unique personality of the
author explain the inaction of the censor.
81
Arts. 199-240 of the Penal Code of 193 I.
88
Arts. 180-189ofthebasicpolicelaw of June 18, 1931, No. 773. Cf. EBENSTEIN, FASCIST ITALY 71-77 (1939).
89
For other examples, see 2 CoNSIGLio, RELAZIONE 3-6 (1939).
9
°Council of State, 4th sec., August 12, 1921, Della Valle v. Commissario del
governo, GIUR. IT. 1922.III.50.
91
Council of State, 5th sec., April 28, 1939, Impresa Stoelcker v. Ministero delPinterno, FoRo IT. 1939.III.260.
92
Council of State, 5th sec., June IO, 1932, Azzini v. Ministero dell'interno,
FoRo AMMIN. 1932.I.2.780.
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corporations of a dismissed official of a guild,98 concession of citizenship,94 and expulsion of a citizen from the territory of an African
colony.95 It has asserted that although these matters may be within the
field of "acts of government," the specific acts complained of in the
particular cases did not involve the supreme interests of the state.
The Council has also resisted, by strict construction, the other type
of limitation upon its jurisdiction, in the form of legislative enactments
exempting particular acts from review. The administrative court has
declared as a general rule that an exclusion of its jurisdiction must be
interpreted narrowly. 96 A striking application of this principle was made
when the Council rejected the claim of the administration that statutory
unreviewability of a positive act should be deemed to include also its
revocation. 97 The Council has also declared that it does not lack jurisdiction to ascertain whether a certain act is really an exercise of the
particular power which a statute has made unreviewable. In the leading
case, it was held that
". . . the authority to issue the order constitutes the basis for the
exclusion of the remedy of the recourse, and therefore it operates
as a limit to the unreviewability of the act. The legislature intended to exclude from review only orders effectively within the
authority conferre~ upon the High Commissioner [ of Naples]
by the decree of April 11, 1926, and not any act which the High
Commissioner might arbitrarily declare to issue under powers
which in fact he does not have." 98
93

Council of State, 4th sec., July 27, 1937, Torlonia v. Ministero delle corporazioni, GmR. IT. 1938.III.1.
9
"' Council of State, 4th sec., July 26, 1938, Kauffmann v. Ministero dell'interno,
FoRo IT. 1939.III.10.
95
Council of State, 4th sec., March 22, 1939, De Rosa v. Ministero dell'Africa
italiana, FoRo IT. 1939.III.u3. Contra, CucINOTTA, D1ruTTo coLONIALE ITALIANO,
3d ed., 187 (1938), who considers the expulsions to be always "acts of government."
96
Uniform decisions of the Council: 4th sec., Nov. 24, 1923, Gianni Domenica
v. Ministero dell'agricoltura, Riv. DIR. PunBL. 1924.Il.14; 5th sec., June 10, 1932,
Azzini v. Ministero dell'interno, Riv. DIR. PunnL. 1932.II.780; 4th sec., December
10, 1937, Chiodoni v. Ministero delle finanze, FoRo IT. 1938.III.43. Cf. Court of
Cassation, in bane, December 13, 1937, Ministero dei lavori pubblici v. Novara, FoRo
IT. 1938.I.7, GmR. IT. 1938.I.1.23497 Council of State, 4th sec., March 6, 1936, Grilli v. Ministero delle communicazioni, FoRo IT. 1936.III.73, confirmed by the Court of Cassation, in bane, July 23,
1937, Ferrovie dello Stato v. Grilli, No. 1, FoRo IT. 1937.I.1443.
118
Council of State, 4th sec., Jan. 26, 1928, Raja v. Alto Commissario di Napoli,
FoRo AJ.UUN. 1928.I.1.105. It is interesting to note that a similar line of reasoning
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This distinction is a delicate one, and in some cases the Court of
Cassation has annulled decisions of the Council. In the De Conciliis
case, the power to expropriate for reasons of public utility, in connection with the clearing of a Neapolitan district, had been invoked to
cover what was, in fact, only a simple exchange of land. The Council
of State annulled the action of the administration, on the ground that it
was beyond its statutory authority. The Court of Cassation, however,
held that the Council had exercised its review of an act which was
outside its jurisdiction.99 Under this view, however, the simple reference to a provision excluding review would enable the administration
to escape control at its whim. In a more recent decision, the Court of
Cassation has held that the Council must ascertain what powers the
statute confers upon the administration free of review and compare
them with those actually exercised in the case at hand. If there has
been an abuse, the Council can annul the act for lack of authority.100
Another striking illustration of the efforts of the Council of State to
preserve justice in the administration is afforded by the Loyola case.101
A legislative decree had empowered the minister of national education
to appoint as provincial educational supervisor any person, whether in
the civil service or not, if in his unreviewable judgment the appointee
had merit or aptitude for the position. Another section of the decree
allowed the transfer of the provincial educational supervisor to any
position of the same rank. In one instance, the minister, one of the
Quadrumviri-the highest officials of the Fascist party-appointed a
supervisor and after three months transferred him to another position.
In another instance, the newly appointed official did not even take
charge of his office and remained attached to the minister. The interested parties were prevented from obtaining judicial review of the
appointments because of the express statutory provision, but they
brought suit to contest the transfers. The Council of State, disarmed
against the power of appointment by the minister, set aside the transfers
has been followed by English courts dealing with the problem of ultra vires and the
statutory formula that regulations issued under statutory delegation shall have effect "as
if enacted in the act of delegation itself." See Rava, "Emergency Powers in Great
Britain," 21 BosT. UNiv. L. REv. 403-at 447 (1941).
99
Court of Cassation, June 10, 1936, Alto Commissariato per la citta e provincia
di Napoli v. De Concilliis, FoRo h. 1936.I.737.
10 Court of Cassation, December 13, 1937, Ministero dei lavori pubblici v. Novara,
FoRo h. 1938.I.7, GrnR. h. 1938.I.1.234.
101 Council of State, 4th sec., April 27, 1937, Loyola v. Ministero dell'educazione
nazionale, FoRo h. 1937.III.121.
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because of misuse of power. The acts of appointment were considered
as evidence bearing upon the misuse of administrative discretion in
making the transfers. This decision is remarkable as an example of
the ability of the Council of State to check an obvious abuse of discretion; 102 there is, however, some doubt about the logical correctness
of the decision. The misuse of power affected the unreviewable first
act of appointment and not the second of transfer.
In appraising this reaction of the Council against the attempt of
the administration, the point must, however, be stressed that the final
word rests with the administration, which can easily obtain the promulgation of a statute or of an emergency decree to give an impregnable
basis to its will, free of any judicial review. Thus when the Council
of State rejected a contention of the administration that the decisions
of the minister of finance upon violations of currency restrictions were
"acts of government" and as such unreviewable, a law was passed to
exclude review by the Council.108 When the Council applied its standards of notice and hearing to the dismissal of officials, ordered by public
administrations pursuant to the extraordinary powers conferred upon
them by the regime,104 an interpretative statute was passed to declare
notice and hearing unnecessary.1° 5

III
CONCLUSIONS

In a civil law country the Italian Council of State ( like its counterpart in France) is the only judicial body to have developed a system
of case law. The liberal trend of the principles established by the
Council is evidenced by the fact that some of them have been finally
reversed on appeal by the Court of Cassation. Thus, an administrative
court has revealed itself more zealous in checking the administration
than have the ordinary courts. Various factors have contributed to this
effect. On the one hand, the principles of the law of 1865 limiting the
jurisdiction of ordinary courts in regard to administrative acts have
contributed to the establishment of a mental restraint on the part of
102
A malicious observer would remark that at the time of the decision the minister
in question got another job, being placed in charge of a distant island.
103
Emergency decree of December 5, 1938, No. 1928, art. II. See Council of
State, 4th sec., November 29, 1939, Pesce v. Ministero delle finanze, Riv. DIR. PuBBL.
1940.II.1362.
104
Council of State, 5th sec., July 22, 1926, Leoni v. Comune di Genova, Fo&o
AMMIN. 1926.I.2.310; 4th sec., June 28, 1929, Fala v. Ministero economia nazionale,
Fo&o AMMIN. 1929.I.1.338.
105
Act of June 24, 1929, No. n12.
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the judges towards the administration. New reasons for this attitude
have been furnished by the dictatorial state. On the other hand, the
composition of the Council provides a personnel of great administrative experience and generally well qualified for the task of reviewing
administrative decisions. Secondly, the origin itself of the judicial
functions of the Council has been an efficient stimulus in promoting a
tradition of fair treatment for the complainant. The administration is
a necessary party to every judicial proceeding instituted before the
Council, and therefore the councillors are free of that metus reverentialis
which often assails an ordinary judge, who is only on rare occasions
called upon to decide against the administration.
Typical of the part played by the administrative judge is the review for excess of power which has been developed by the Council of
State as a most valuable means of performing a limited but efficient
control over discretion. On the other hand, the full review of administrative discretion and expediency allowed in particular cases has not
reached a similar development, because the Council of State has refrained from extending, or even making full use of, its powers.
In the past, it has been proposed 106 to remodel the Council of State
along German patterns,101 by splitting the advisory and judicial functions of the body and creating a wholly separate administrative court.
However, in the light of the record established by the Council, Italian
lawyers have been generally skeptical about such reforms. The institution of a body similar to the French Tribunal of Conflicts has also
been advocated, to hear the appeals now carried from decisions of the
Council to the Court of Cassation in bane. The latter reform seems
more desirable than the first.108
In spite of its achievements, the Council of State has not been in a
position to oppose the political stream which has overcome every kind
of resistance in the totalitarian melting. It is significant that the prime
minister has found it necessary to stress, and to repeat on more than

°Cf. Scialoia, "Per una riforma delle sezioni giurisdizionali del Consiglio di
Stato," Rrv. DrR. PuBBL. 1909.l.1; Codacci-Pisanelli, "Sulle riforme desiderabili nell'ordinamento della giustizia amministrativa," id. 1912.l.37; D'Amelio, "Sulla istituzione in Italia di en supremo tribunale amministrativo," id. 1912.l.7.170; Schanzer,
"Sulle riforme nell'ordinamento della giustizia amministrativa centrale," id. 1912.I.161 ;
BoRS1, LA GIUSTIZIA AMMINISTRATIVA, 5th ed., 184-185 (1940).
101
For discussion in English of the German system, see Uhlman and Rupp, "The
German System of Administrative Courts," 31 ILL. L. REV. 847, 1028 (1937).
108
The informal method of reaching a settlement of conflicts between Court of
Cassation and Council of State by means of an academic study conducted by the respective presidents, as in the case mentioned above (supra, note 25), is not an adequate
substitute for an appropriate tribunal.
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one occasion, that "Fascist administration is an administration of justice,
and that the review of the Council of State does not hamper it, but
brings it back to its essential tasks." 109 In a system where no political
pressure is exercised on the courts, and their independence is a fully
recognized principle, there would be no need for such a statement.
Since the Council of State cannot exercise any check against statutes,
nor to any substantial extent against decrees having legislative force,
the efficacy of its control can always be overcome, and the administration
has demonstrated its ability to avail itself of this means as well as to
broaden the concept of the unreviewable "acts of government."
The working of administrative courts under Fascism shows the
contrast between the tradition of legal individualism and the prevailing and continuously progressing forces of the new regime. Instituted
originally as the supreme safeguard for the citizen against administrative abuses, the Council of State is now restricted in its functions to
minor matters and subject to curtailment whenever the administration
deems that an important issue is at stake. Thus the jurisdiction which
the Council can effectively exercise has no definite compass, for it
depends upon the various interests and the political strength of the
leaders involved.110
109

See, e.g., speeches of December 22, 1928, and August 18, 1931, respectively
in FoRo AMMIN. 1929.IV.1 and RIV. DxR. PtrnBL. 1931.I.401.
110 It is worthy of notice that these conclusions are similar to those reached in that
interesting study of Nazi Germany, FRAENKEL, THE DUAL STATE (1941).

